Lebanese government expands Starlink licensing, grants Telecom Minister special authority

Citing “exceptional circumstances” amid ongoing war and the forced displacement of more than 700,000 people, Lebanon’s government approved a decision on Thursday, March 5, 2026, to expand eligibility for Starlink satellite internet services and delegated new licensing authority to the telecommunications minister.

The move amends Decision No. 5 issued on September 11, 2025, which had granted a license to “Starlink – Lebanon.” The amendment broadens the range of entities eligible to use the service and transfers licensing authority to the telecommunications minister, while also removing earlier provisions that required security agencies to have access to the system’s oversight infrastructure.

Broader eligibility and threats to privacy

The Lebanese government decided to broaden the scope of the previous license granted to Starlink – Lebanon, allowing the company to now sell its services to government entities, embassies, and non-governmental organizations for official and humanitarian purposes, whereas the license had previously been limited to commercial entities.

The core risks of this expansion lie in the following:

• Ambiguous definitions: The decision provides no clear definitions of what constitutes “government entities” or “humanitarian purposes,” leaving the scope of eligible beneficiaries uncertain. It remains unclear whether the terms include public institutions, municipalities, or independent bodies.
• Direct threat to privacy: The ambiguity surrounding how users’ data will be handled, and the absence of a clearly designated authority responsible for approving organizations, is a direct threat to the right to privacy of individuals and the communities served by non-governmental organizations.
• A cover for unlawful surveillance: This same ambiguity could facilitate unlawful monitoring or political targeting under the pretext of “official purposes” or “security concerns,” undermining the humanitarian justification used to support exception.

A waiver of security approval or of digital sovereignty?

The most serious aspect of the government’s decision is that it allows Starlink to sell its services without prior security approvals and before the planned security oversight center in Qatar becomes operational.

According to the new decision, the center will not be ready before next May due to the war in Lebanon. This assigns the responsibility for obtaining the approval of the competent security agencies to the Minister of Telecommunications, who is also supposed to determine the number of devices that these entities will be allowed to use.

Although the previous decision had already undermined digital sovereignty by allowing the control center to be outside the country, it had at least preserved the condition under which security agencies will have access to the oversight infrastructure.

Today, however, the service has been authorized for use even in the absence of a security control center. This constitutes a complete hollowing out of the guarantees of monitoring and protection, and a serious concession to users’ data protection.

If the center is truly a fundamental condition for protection, allowing the service to operate before its establishment nullifies that safeguard. Conversely, if it is not essential, presenting it as a justification for the decision undermines the credibility of the government’s argument.

Furthermore, the new decision does not meet international standards for digital rights, which require that any surveillance or access to data be “lawful, necessary, and proportionate,” particularly in the absence of the security center and of effective oversight.

Circumventing legal and administrative processes

The decision clearly bypasses the constitutional and administrative frameworks designed to protect users’ rights, including the authority of the State Shura Council and the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA). It also grants broad powers to the Minister of Telecommunications, raising questions about the legitimacy and transparency of the measures taken.

• Bypassing the State Shura Council: The decision explicitly acknowledges that amending the conditions requires consultation with the State Shura Council, yet it circumvented this requirement through a “transitional solution” (a decision by the Council of Ministers) allowing immediate sales, with the conditions to be amended “in parallel” at a later stage. This procedure creates an executive effect before the legal process is completed.
• Individual authority granted to the Minister of Telecommunications: Responsibility for obtaining security agencies’ approval and determining the maximum number of devices that the concerned entities may use has been delegated to the Minister of Telecommunications. This effectively grants him security and regulatory authority that should instead be codified and subject to clear limits.
• Bypassing the TRA: This amendment sidesteps the administrative process that should have been followed through the TRA, opening the door to arbitrary decisions that are not subject to the necessary constitutional or administrative scrutiny.

A deliberate weakening of the national network

Expanding the market for external satellite networks without conducting a genuine feasibility study or linking the move to a national telecommunications emergency plan represents a serious economic and social threat. 

First, it poses a risk to poorer populations. Weakening the national network in favor of satellite networks will further marginalize those who cannot afford the cost of Starlink services.

In addition to the economic losses resulting from a large number of users shifting away from existing networks, neglecting the development of the current internet infrastructure deepens the digital divide and constitutes an indirect violation of the right to equal access to essential services.

The Lebanese government’s decision to expand the scope of beneficiaries of Starlink devices, taken under the pretext of exceptional circumstances, reflects a broader institutional failure. This move represents a clear concession of digital sovereignty and exposes citizens’ data to security, legal, and social risks, in a move that undermines oversight and protection safeguards and bypasses the fundamental principles of the rule of law.

Image source: Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI).