This article was prepared in collaboration with the Iraqi Network for Social Media (INSM).
The Iraqi government, through the Telecommunications and Post Company (ITPC), plans to block Google’s Domain Name System (DNS) servers (8.8.8.8) in the country.
In response to criticism, the Ministry of Communications claimed it only blocks websites based on official orders, not “personal whims.” It dismissed the backlash as a “systematic campaign” trying to undermine Iraq’s morals and society, insisting it would not be swayed by those “fishing in troubled waters.”
Some countries in the region, including Iraq, have often used protecting “moral values” and the “social fabric” as a pretext for actions that violate human rights.
What Are DNS Servers, and How Are They Blocked?
The Domain Name System (DNS) is essential to the internet. It converts website names, like smex.com, into numerical addresses (IPv4 or IPv6) that computers use to find websites. This system is usually built into most devices and is provided by internet companies to help connect home modems and mobile devices to the internet.
DNS is essential for using the internet because it translates website names into numerical addresses. Without it, people would have to type in IP addresses to visit websites, which is very inconvenient. Blocking DNS servers is a severe form of government censorship that limits internet access.
Companies and organizations sometimes block DNS as a security measure to prevent access to harmful services and protect against hacking and malware.
In Iraq, the government plans to block Google’s DNS (8.8.8.8) and replace it with its own system for all internet providers. This new system will likely be used to block certain websites by checking them against a blacklist before allowing access—similar to a contact list that tells you who to avoid.
Let’s say the Iraqi government decides to block the website smex.org. If smex.org is on the blacklist, the new DNS server may act in one of the following ways:
- Display a message indicating that the website is “blocked,” as if the IP address does not exist.
- Redirect users to a different IP address, such as a warning page explaining that the website is blocked for specific reasons.
- Cancel the request entirely, preventing access to smex.org and making it seem as though the website doesn’t exist.
This gives authorities control over domain-based services, deciding which sites can and cannot be accessed. Without a cybersecurity law or clear government procedures on how this blocking will be implemented, there is a risk that DNS control could be used to spread harmful or misleading content on certain websites.
This system could also allow the government to easily target individuals, such as those visiting NGO websites. By blocking the original DNS and redirecting domain names to unrelated websites, as illustrated in the infographic below.
Blocking DNS is not an uncommon practice, but its implementation varies. One common method is to block access at the ISP level, where all DNS requests are routed through the ISP’s custom DNS resolver—either pre-configured on the company-owned modem/router in users’ homes or through mobile network operators. This type of blocking often happens in compliance with government directives, as is the case in Iraq today.
On the other hand, DNS blocking can also be implemented through well-known services like Google, Cloudflare, or OpenDNS. These services offer DNS filtering as a protective measure to safeguard users online by blocking websites that could expose them to phishing attacks or harmful content that might put their safety at risk.
How Will the Ban Affect Users in Iraq?
Blocking access to Google’s DNS creates a fertile ground for cyberattacks and hacking attempts, particularly if weak security measures are implemented or if an unencrypted DNS system is used.
This unencrypted setup would prevent query data from being securely encrypted and allow for the tracking of individuals and their data. Unlike Google’s DNS, which does not store user data when used, the local system could expose users to privacy risks, according to INSM in a statement to SMEX.
In addition to privacy concerns, internet service quality is expected to decline as a result of this decision, INSM adds. A slower DNS system will take longer to translate domain names into IP addresses, leading to increased latency (response time).
For example, online gamers may experience significant delays, slow downloads, and connection issues due to the geographic distance and inefficiency of the new servers. Some games that require DNS-based authentication could even fail to work properly.
Lastly, the decision may impact internet-dependent sectors due to changes in the responsiveness of government servers. For example, this move could have negative consequences for the financial and banking sectors, as well as electronic payment systems.
The potential issues stem from the local system’s lagging behind modern infrastructure, leading to failures in processing electronic card transactions that require fast and specialized servers.
The Constitution and International Agreements
From a legal standpoint, the decision to block Google’s DNS conflicts with the Iraqi Constitution, which guarantees the protection of communication freedoms, including electronic correspondence.
Article 40 of the Iraqi Constitution states: “The freedom of communication and correspondence, postal, telegraphic, electronic, and telephonic, shall be guaranteed and may not be monitored, wiretapped, or disclosed except for legal and security necessity and by a judicial decision.”
Although the article contains vague and loosely defined terms, such as “legal and security necessity,” it is clear in affirming the protection of communication privacy and freedom.
Additionally, Article 46 of the Constitution states: “Restricting or limiting the practice of any of the rights or liberties stipulated in this Constitution is prohibited, except by a law or on the basis of a law, and insofar as that limitation or restriction does not violate the essence of the right or freedom.”
The DNS-blocking decision contradicts this article for two reasons: first, it is not established by law, and second, it infringes on fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and the privacy of communications and data.
Commenting on this, lawyer Mohammed Juma told SMEX that the restrictions imposed by the Iraqi government on the digital space, including website blocking, violate the Constitution.
“No authority has the right to block websites under the pretext of preserving values,” Juma added. “Even if that justification were genuine, why are not all the blocked websites explicitly pornographic? The blacklist also includes movie rating websites and platforms sharing academic research.”
“We have filed a lawsuit with the Administrative Court to stop the blocking decision. The Ministry of Communications responded by claiming that the blocked websites provide pornographic content and that the ban is based on decisions from the Federal Supreme Court.”
“However, the Federal Supreme Court’s decision itself is unconstitutional, as it issued an order to the Ministry of Communications to impose the ban, even though the court does not have the authority to issue binding orders to ministries,” Juma explained.
“We will challenge this decision legally to protect freedom of expression and uphold the Constitution. If left unchallenged, such decisions could pave the way for the emergence of a dictatorship that gradually expands through similar rulings.”
Finally, due to its impact on internet quality and its violation of freedom of expression, the decision constitutes a breach of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Both guarantee the right to freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive, and impart information through any medium of one’s choice.
A History of Legislating Against A Free Digital Space
In August 2023, Iraq’s proposed Cybercrime Law sparked widespread controversy among members of parliament due to its severe violations of human rights. The law included life imprisonment for anyone who deliberately uses “computers or information networks to undermine the country’s independence, unity, security, or interests.”
It also imposed disproportionate fines and punishments, used vague terms, and lacked clear legal definitions. On another front, Iraqi authorities continue to crack down on online content through the “Balgh” (Report) platform, launched in January 2023.
The platform allows individuals to report content on social media deemed “offensive” or “inappropriate.” Human rights advocates have raised concerns that the platform could be exploited to stifle free expression and intimidate bloggers critical of government policies.
Between February and August 2024, around 152,000 complaints were filed, reflecting the platform’s sustained use as a repressive tool, with arrests and prosecutions continuing for two consecutive years.
Additionally, the government regularly shuts down internet access during exam periods, claiming it is necessary to prevent cheating or leaks during school exams. This practice has cost Iraq over $209 million in lost economic growth, highlighting how even short-term internet blackouts can have long-term negative effects on the national economy.
These interruptions also unjustifiably disrupt daily life for citizens across the country. Moreover, restricting internet access during emergencies and crises violates the fundamental right to freedom of expression, as it prevents individuals from communicating, accessing critical information, and responding to urgent situations.
Over the past few years, Iraq’s government has engaged in various restrictive practices, including shutting down websites indefinitely without clear justification and threatening to ban TikTok. In fact, Iraqi Minister of Communications Hayam Al-Yasiri submitted a request to the Council of Ministers to block TikTok, claiming the app contributes to the “fragmentation of Iraq’s social fabric.”
These practices, along with the recent decision to block Google’s DNS servers, share common features: vague language, a lack of legal justification, and the overarching goal of tightening government control over digital spaces.
Doesn’t all of this contradict the modern approach that Iraqi authorities claim to be adopting regarding digital transformation? How does the government expect to achieve its digital transformation goals when it continuously makes decisions that undermine them?
What Should You Know About the Ban, and How Can You Bypass It?
The good thing about the internet is that it allows you to connect your devices—whether a laptop, mobile phone, or even a home router—to any DNS resolver of your choice.
One effective method to bypass the ban is by using alternative DNS servers, which allow users to configure their devices locally to connect to a DNS server that does not enforce the block. A popular option is Quad9, a free service that replaces your ISP’s DNS to protect against harmful activities and threats while ensuring smoother access.
Another option is using a reliable Virtual Private Network (VPN). VPNs typically come with their own private DNS servers. Since VPNs encrypt your internet traffic, including DNS requests, they make it possible to bypass restrictions imposed by local ISPs.
The third option involves enabling DNS over HTTPS (DoH) or DNS over TLS (DoT). These protocols encrypt DNS queries, making it difficult for ISPs or network administrators to block or monitor them. This option is easy to enable, as it is built into Android devices (version 11 or higher) and the latest iOS devices.
Cover image by AFP.
